Default-deny egress for untrusted workloads.
A compromised workload can't exfiltrate what it never had. iron-proxy enforces default-deny egress and injects real credentials on-the-fly. Your workload never sees them.
Every workload you don't fully control can reach the internet.
AI agents, CI/CD pipelines, and third-party code all get outbound network access by default. They also get your secrets. Exfiltration is one curl away.
Control what gets out. Audit everything else.
iron-proxy sits between your workload and the internet. It terminates TLS, enforces your allowlist, and swaps proxy tokens for real credentials at egress.
Default-deny egress. TLS-terminating proxy with full payload inspection, not just SNI.
Secret injection at the boundary. Workloads get proxy tokens. Real credentials are swapped in at egress.
Per-request audit log. Every outbound connection logged as structured JSON. OTel-ready.
iron-proxy is how you start → iron.sh is how you scale
The control plane for iron-proxy deployments.
When you have fifty workloads across three environments, YAML doesn't cut it. Manage policy, secrets, and audit logs from one place.
Centralized policy management
Define and push allowlists across all your proxies. Version policies. Audit changes. No more YAML drift across hosts.
Secrets integration
Pull credentials from Vault, AWS KMS, or your existing secrets manager. iron-proxy resolves them at egress so secrets never touch the workload.
Aggregated audit logs
Every egress decision from every proxy, queryable in one dashboard. OTel-native export to your existing observability stack.
Alerting & anomaly detection
Get notified when a workload tries to reach something it shouldn't. Catch compromised code before it becomes an incident.
Built for anything you don't fully trust.
AI agents & copilots
Your agent runs code, calls APIs, installs packages. It's one prompt injection away from exfiltrating your credentials. Contain the blast radius at the network boundary.
CI/CD pipelines
Every npm install and pip install runs third-party code with full network access. Supply chain attacks like the Trivy/TPCP incident just need one outbound connection.
Third-party code
Plugins, integrations, customer-submitted code, webhooks. If it can reach the internet, it can exfiltrate. Default-deny egress is the first line of defense.
Control the boundary.
Start with iron-proxy in five minutes. Talk to us when you're ready to manage policy at scale.